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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC.
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and,
RICHARD ANDREWS,

Case No. 91-0384

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs,
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney
General of the State of Utah,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HON. FRANK G. NOEL, JUDGE PRESIDING
(Trial Court Case No. C-91-090-2847)

THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
CHRIS ALLEN and RICHARD ANDREWS, by and through their
counsel of record, Brian M. Barnard and John Pace of the
Utah Legal Clinic, submit the following Brief in support of
Plaintiffs' appeal.

1

STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION
Appellants (the "Society") bring this appeal from a
decision by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Hon* Frank Noel, judge presiding.
The Third Judicial District Court granted the appellee's
(the "Attorney General's") motion to dismiss.

Appellants

seek the reversal of this decision and an opportunity for a
hearing on the merits.
This Court has jurisdiction in this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 4A of the Utah Rules of AppellateProcedure and Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Issues
1.

Were any facts presented to the trial court to

establish that plaintiffs' complaint was moot?
2.

Did the trial court rule correctly in denying this

matter judicial review either for the purpose of providing
future guidance to the Attorney General and other public
officials or for the purpose of interpreting the Utah
Constitution?
3.

Is the Society entitled to injunctive and

declaratory relief as to the unconstitutionality of the

Attorney General's past and anticipated financing of a proprayer stance in the Rhode Island case, Lee v. Weisman, No.
90-1014 pending before the United States Supreme Court?

II. Standard of Review
Because the trial court's ruling on these issues is
strictly a legal conclusion, this court need accord it no
deference and should apply a "correction of error" standard
of review.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah

1988) .

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions are
determinative in this action:
Article I, § 4, Utah Constitution:
The right of conscience shall never be infringed.
. . . There shall be no union of Church and
State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or
for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion . . .

3

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
The Society challenges the constitutionality of the
Attorney General's filing of an amicus brief urging review
in Weisman v. Lee1 by the United States Supreme Court.

In

addition, this challenge is based on the Attorney General's
public promise to submit another brief on the merits in the
Rhode Island school prayer case.

Appellants seek injunctive

and declaratory relief to establish the unconstitutionality
of this activity.
This action arises under Article I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution which prohibits the appropriation of public
funds to further religious exercise.

By submitting his

legal argument in the Rhode Island case, the Attorney
General unconstitutionally funded the promotion of religious
exercise and ecclesiastic establishment at public expense.
Because important issues of constitutional interpretation and the propriety of a public official's conduct
are raised by this matter, it deserves judicial attention
despite its possible mootness.

1

The Attorney General's

The cases below were Weisman v. Lee, 728 F.Supp. 68
(D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir.).
4

public statement that he will commit further public funds
toward legal involvement in the Rhode Island school prayer
case underscores the need for judicial direction and
instruction in this case,

II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
This is an appeal from a decision by the Hon, Frank
Noel of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint (Exhibit "a" attached;
Trial Record, pp. 3-8) as set forth in the court's Minute
Entry of July 9, 1991 (Exhibit "b" attached; Trial Record,
pp. 31-3 3) and later embodied in an Order of Dismissal
signed July 30, 1991.
pp. 88-89.

Exhibit "c" attached; Trial Record,

The notice of appeal was dated August 5, 1991

and was timely filed.

Exhibit "d" attached; Trial Record,

pp. 92-93.
Judge Noel dismissed this action believing that the
case was moot.

The district court declined to rule on the

constitutionality of the contested behavior, contending that
such an opinion would provide no future guidance to the
Attorney General should a similar situation arise.

The

court further offered dicta that the actions of the Attorney
General in filing the first amicus brief were within the
5

scope of his authority.

In contrast, the Appellants seek a

ruling on the merits of the issues implicated by this case
establishing the unconstitutionality of the Attorney
General's past and anticipated appropriations.

III.
A.

Statement of Facts

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In response to plaintiffs' complaint, defendant filed a

motion to dismiss (Trial Record, pp. 12-13) and a supporting
memorandum on May 28, 1991 (Trial Record, pp. 14-2 0)
suggesting, inter alia, that plaintiffs' claims were moot.
Defendant's counsel's assertions notwithstanding, defendant
never filed any affidavit(s) to prove the facts necessary to
establish mootness.
prove mootnesse

The burden was and is upon defendant to

There were no facts before the trial court

and there are no facts before this Court to establish that
plaintiffs' claims are moot.
Because the complaint was dismissed on a motion to
dismiss, all of the facts well plead in plaintiffs'
complaint must be deemed as true.

Exhibit "a" attached.

The source of the following statement of facts is
largely plaintiffs' complaint.

6

Exhibit "a" attached.

B.

PACTS BEFORE THE COURT
The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists,

Inc., comprised of citizens and taxpayers of Utah including
appellants Chris Allen and Richard Andrews, has as a
corporate goal the preservation of the separation of church
and state as required by state and federal constitutional
law.

Complaint, 5 1.
On January 17, 1991, the appellee Attorney General

filed an amicus brief with United States Supreme Court in
the case of Lee v. Weisman supporting the Providence, Rhode
Island school board's petition for a writ of certiorari.
The Attorney General sought judicial review and a reversal
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision prohibiting
public prayers at high school graduation ceremonies.
Complaint, J 7; (a copy of the amicus brief is filed as an
exhibit in this action, Trial Record, pp. 34-54.)
After the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear
the Rhode Island case, the Attorney General publicly stated
that his office would file another amicus brief —
addressing the merits —

in that case.

this time

In addition, on

April 24, 1991, the Salt Lake Tribune carried a "letter to
the editor" from the Attorney General promising such action.
Exhibit "e" attached.
7

The following week, on Law Day, May 1, 1991, the
Society filed this action, seeking a temporary restraining
order and a permanent injunction to prevent the filing of
that second brief on the merits and contending that the
Attorney General's past and future promised behavior
violated the Utah Constitution.

Exhibit "a".

Defendant's counsel claims that May 22, 1991 was the
United States Supreme Court deadline for the filing of
another amicus brief in support of the Rhode Island School
Board.

On May 28, 1991 the Attorney General submitted a

motion to dismiss in this case asserting that this action
was moot due to the passing of this alleged deadline.
As these events were occurring, other Utah public
officials were becoming involved in the Rhode Island case.
The Superintendent of Utah Public Schools, Jay B. Taggart,
contributed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) of taxpayer
money to the Providence, Rhode Island School District to
finance the district's lawsuit.

This contribution was to

assist Rhode Island in defending its practice of allowing
graduation prayers.

Superintendent Taggart also threatened

to file a brief on the merits in that case.

Society of

Separationists. Inc., et al vs. Jay B. Taggart, etc.,
pending before this Court as Case No. 91-0387.
8

In addition,

the Alpine School District actually filed an amicus brief in
Lee v, Weisman on the merits which vigorously advocated
prayer in public schools.

Society of Separationists, Inc.

et al vs. The Board of Education of Alpine School District,
pending in Fourth District Court in and for Utah County,
Case No. 91-040-0647.

In light of this activity, the

Society opted to pursue its claim, seeking judicial
consideration of issues raised by the Attorney General's
conduct.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Neither the trial court nor this Court have been
presented with any evidence to show that plaintiffs/
appellants' complaint is moot.
Although appellants' complaint might be technically
moot, substantial precedent and argument support the
Society's request for a hearing on the merits.

The disputed

acts of the Attorney General raise important questions
concerning constitutional interpretation and governmental
conduct which are worthy of judicial review.

In addition,

because it is almost impossible to contest the propriety of
one time public expenditures before such claims become moot,
this Court should take this opportunity to rule on an issue
9

that would otherwise evade judicial review.

Finally, the

unilateral claim of the Attorney General that he has temporarily refrained from filing an amicus brief on the merits
of the Rhode Island case does not diminish the need for
judicial guidance in this matter.
If subjected to judicial scrutiny, the actions of the
Attorney General would prove unconstitutional.

Seeking

certiorari review in the Rhode Island case entails
supporting the position of allowing graduation prayer and
thus involves the unconstitutional expenditure of Utah
public funds.

10

ARGUMENT
I. ALTHOUGH ALLEGEDLY MOOT, THIS CASE DESERVES JUDICIAL
REVIEW.2
This Court favors access to the courts for the
resolution of controversies.

Because the dismissal of an

action without a hearing is a severe measure, this court has
warned that the procedure is to be used sparingly:

lf

[T]he

trial court should adhere to a policy of being reluctant to
turn a party out of court without a trial." Wells v. Walker
Bank and Trust Co., Inc., 590 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979).
See also Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah
1990); Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 243 P.2d 411
(Utah 1952).

The case before this Court presents valid and

important issues of constitutional interpretation and the
appropriateness of official conduct which deserve judicial
attention.

To dismiss this action deprived both the

appellants and the public of an opportunity for adjudication
of their rights.

2

Beyond the unverified assertions of defendants
counsel, no evidence has been submitted to show plaintiffs'
claims are moot. Plaintiffs' complaint on its face does not
establish mootness.
11

A, Exceptions to the mootness doctrine exist where important
issues of wide concern and apt to be repeated affect the
public interest.
Although there is a strong policy against adjudication
of moot questions, circumstances do exist which afford
exception to this practice.

See Merhish v. H.A. Folsom &

Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah 1982) .3

In Wickham v.

Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981), this court announced
criteria for determining which cases deserved continued
judicial attention despite their apparent mootness:
The principles that determine the justiciability
of the instant case are the well-established rules
which permit a court to litigate an issue which,
although technically moot as to a particular
litigant at the time of appeal, is of wide
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to
recur in a similar manner, and because of the
brief time any one person is affected, would
otherwise escape judicial review.
Id. at 899 (citations omitted).

See also Kelp v.

Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah 1987); Southern Pacific
Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S.

3

In Merhish, this Court ruled that when the only
relief sought — a wage payment — was awarded in full, the
respondent's motion concerning a lien and garnishment was
moot. The Court held that Merhish was moot because the
employee had been granted his wage payments and further
requests for judicial relief would not affect the rights of
the litigants. Here, however, no relief has been granted to
appellants and a clarification of constitutional rights
would result from judicial determination.
12

498, 515 (1911) (determining that "moot" situations "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" should be subject to
judicial review).

While the decision to address a moot

issue rests with the court, the choice to hear a case is
most often made in "class actions, questions of
constitutional interpretation, issues as to the validity or
construction of a statute, or the propriety of
administrative rulings."

Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d

1044 (Utah 1990) (quoting McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190,
1191 (Utah 1974)).

Additionally, exceptions to the mootness

doctrine are justified when "there seldom will be sufficient
time for an appellate court to intervene before" the
challenged conduct is concluded.

Society of Professional

Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 1987).
The view that issues of particular public importance
should be reviewed despite their apparent mootness is
supported by several opinions from other jurisdictions.

The

New Mexico Supreme Court maintained that although recently
passed legislation resolved the issues in the case before
the bench, the important constitutional concern of
separation of powers raised by Mowrer v. Rusk warranted
judicial determination, 518 P.2d 866 (N.M. 1980).

Because

"[t]he parameters of the separation of powers doctrine
13

present a recurring problem of great public interest," the
case could not be dismissed because of mootness.
890.

Mowrer, at

The Court reasoned that "[a]mong the criteria

considered in determining the existence of the requisite
degree of public interest are . . . the desirability of an
authoritative determination for future guidance of public
officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the
question."

Xd. at 889 (citing People v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d

769, 772 (111. 1952) (cert, denied)).
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit insisted that although the school district
indicated that prayers in band class would not be continued,
Steele v. Van Buren Public School District presented an
actual controversy:

"Voluntary cessation of allegedly

illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to
hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case
moot."

845 F.2d 1492, 1494 (8th Cir. 1988)(quoting United

States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953) (where
"the heavy burden of demonstrating that xthere is no
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated' was
placed on the defendant")).

Because the Van Buren school

district failed to show "that it does not and will not
permit prayer at school functions," the case was not moot.
14

Steele at 1494-95.

The challenge to the school district

action remained valid because the defendant was free to
resume the disputed conduct.

Id. at 1494.

B. Because this case presents critical questions of
constitutional interpretation and qovernmental conduct which
impact the public interest, it deserves the attention of
this court.
As the foregoing cases establish, the current matter
presents constitutional issues which demand clarification by
this Court.

The actions of the Attorney General —

the use

of public funds to file an amicus curiae brief in the case
of Lee v. Weisman, and a public promise to file another
brief on the merits in the same case —
significant to the public interest.

raise questions

In particular, the

lengthy and detailed language of the Utah religious
establishment clause imposes a heightened duty on state
actors to maintain rigid separation of church and state.
Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 4.

Indeed, few things

warrant the attention of this Court nor threaten the public
interest more than the possibility that state officials are
violating a highly prized provision of the State
Constitution.
Application of the criteria for exceptions to the
mootness doctrine recited in Wickham indicate that this
15

matter should not be dismissed without judicial review.

The

constitutional questions at issue here —> the character of
the state establishment clause protections —

in the context

of official conduct are of broad public concern.

In

addition, the speed with which public officials can dedicate
public funds under their discretion to the support religious
exercise will rarely permit adequate opportunity for
judicial intervention before an appropriation has been made
and the funds spent.

Also significant is the emphasis in

Wickham and Mowrer that issues technically moot but prone to
repetition should be decided on their merits.

In the

absence of direction from this Court, the challenged
behavior of the Attorney General is likely to reoccur and
the parameters of the separation of church and state in Utah
are apt to remain ambiguous.

As in Mowrer, a ruling on the

constitutionality of the Attorney General's conduct would
serve to guide not only his future actions, but those of all
public officials entrusted with discretion over the public
coffers.
The principle of Steele that unilateral cessation of
challenged behavior does not lessen the relevance of
judicial intervention further supports the appellants'
arguments.

Although the first amicus brief has long been
16

filed, the Attorney General insists that he did not violate
the State Constitution by spending public funds in support
of a pro-prayer legal stance.

Although the Attorney General

recanted on his public pledge to file a second amicus brief
on the merits, his promise to do so indicates that he finds
nothing unsettling about his past behavior and that he would
not hesitate to engage in similar behavior in the future.
Clearly, under W.T. Grant, the Attorney General has not met
his burden of demonstrating that he will not repeat the
contested conduct.

Despite the appellee's alleged voluntary

and temporary termination of his disputed appropriations, he
remains free to (and apparently prone to) engage in similar
behavior unless there is a ruling from this Court.4
The reasoning and direction of these cases indicates
that appellants' request for injunctive and declaratory
relief is worthy of a judicial attention.

4

Appellants are

Guidance to governmental officials is especially
necessary and important to the constitutional issues raised
by this case; not only the Attorney General has become
involved in spending public funds on the Rhode Island School
prayer case. Jay Taggart, Utah State School Superintendent,
outright gave ten thousand dollars ($10,000) of taxpayers'
money to the Providence, Rhode Island School District to
support their pro-prayer position in Lee v. Weisman and
vowed to file an amicus brief in that case as well. In
addition, on May 24, 1991, the Alpine School District in
Utah County filed their own amicus brief in Lee v. Weisman,
vigorously advocating prayer at public school functions.
17

entitled to a ruling on the constitutionality of the
Attorney General's behavior especially in light of his
failure to guarantee that similar appropriations will not be
made.

Courts are particularly compelled to make judgments

when constitutional questions and the lawfulness of conduct
of public officials is at issue.

Most importantly, a ruling

on the merits of this case will properly serve the important
public interest in further delineating the separation of
church and state demanded by Utah's establishment clause.

II. THE SOCIETY DESERVES INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
ON THE BASIS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAST AND ANTICIPATED
INVOLVEMENT IN THE RHODE ISLAND PRAYER CASE.
By using public funds to compose and file an amicus
brief urging the United States Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in the matter of Lee v. Weisman, the Attorney
General violated the Utah State Constitution.

Article I, §

4 of that charter provides, in part:
The right of conscience shall never be infringed.
. . . There shall be no union of Church and
State, nor shall any church dominate the State of
interfere with its functions. No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or
for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
The effect of petitioning the United States Supreme Court to
review the First Circuit decision in Weisman v. Lee was to
18

seek the overturn of that case and to establish a legal
precedent for state sanctioned prayers at various public
school ceremonies.

In addition, the Attorney General

further jeopardized public funds by promising to file a
brief on the merits in that case.

Thus, the Attorney

General unlawfully utilized public funds to promote
religious exercise breaching the wall between church and
state erected by Utah's establishment clause.

Although the

appellee can exercise discretion in the pursuit of public
interest, he can do so only within constitutional limits.5

A. The Utah establishment clause is a formidable separation
between church and state and prohibits the use of public
funds to threaten this division.
The Utah State Constitution provides a strict and
specific guarantee of separation of church and state.

See

Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 689 (Utah 1982) (Stewart,
J., concurring and dissenting, four separate opinions,
utilizing constitutional construction which looked to the
precise wording of the provision for the framers' intent).

State of Utah v. Jiminez. 588 P.2d 707 (Utah 1978),
has been cited to support the argument that the Attorney
General is free to use his discretion in the public
interest. While public officials are often empowered to
perform duties which require the exercise of broad duties,
they are never authorized to violate the Constitution.
19

Specifically, the Utah Constitution establishes the right of
citizens not to have public funds spent on religious
exercise, to have a government free of secular influence and
to have a government which does not involve itself in the
endorsement of religion.

See Manning v. Sevier County. 517

P.2d 549, 552-553 (Utah 1973) (Crockett, J., concurring,
"Section 4, Article I . . . is more articulate and express
[than the federal constitution] in assuring religious
liberty and prohibiting discrimination, or church
interference with private or public rights.11).

By expanding

the protection owed its citizens beyond that provided by
federal law, the authors of the Utah Constitution emphasized
the importance of prohibiting conduct such as that of the
Attorney General which smacks of state encouragement or
endorsement of religious exercise.
Although Utah courts have had little opportunity to
interpret the provisions of the State Constitution relevant
to this case, other states with similar constitutional
provisions have afforded their citizens extensive
protections.

See Sands v. Morongo Unified School District,

809 P.2d 809, 816 (Cal. 1991) (finding "sectarian" public
prayers unacceptable because they appeared to "place the
government's stamp of approval on a particular type of
20

religious practice11); California Teachers Association v.
Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981); Witters v State Commission
for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989); Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 489 rehearing denied, 475 U.S. 1091 (1986); Weiss v.
Bruno, 506 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1973) (announcing that the
conclusive prohibitions of the Washington state charter
precluded the use of a balancing test or a claim of ffde
minimis" violation to avoid entanglement); Kay v. Douglas
School District, 719 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986).
Both statutory interpretation and reference to the laws
of other states indicate that Utah's religion clause
absolutely prohibits the use of public money or aid to
encourage, even indirectly, prayer or the institution of
prayer.

The unconditional pronouncements of Article I, § 4

place rigid constraint upon state action.

Importantly, this

provision disallows the public underwriting of legal stance
seeking the institutionalization and approval of prayer at
graduation ceremonies.
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B. The function of defendant's filing an amicus brief with
the Supreme Court was to promote prayer in public schools
and to unlaw-fully spend Utah public funds.
By encouraging certiorari review of the Rhode Island
case, the Attorney General was, in effect, seeking the
overturn of the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision
banning such prayer.
argument —

In addition, the Attorney General's

that by filing the brief he sought only a ruling

to aid the resolution of issues in Utah —
fails.

necessarily

Because no neutral reason for filing the amicus

brief exists, the Attorney General's action are implicated
as pro-prayer.

Finally, by promising to file a brief on the

merits of Rhode Island case, the Attorney General further
illustrated his willingness to spend public funds in support
of graduation prayers.6
The First Circuit decision in Weisman v. Lee is
consistent with the rulings of other federal Courts of
Appeal that prayer at public school events violates the

6

Interestingly, in his motion to dismiss herein the
Attorney General claimed that the time for him to file an
amicus brief on the merits had expired. At the time he
filed that motion, the time had expired only if he was
planning on filing a brief in support of the Providence,
Rhode Island school board. If he had intended to file an
amicus brief in support of the persons objecting to school
prayer, the time limit had not expired.
22

federal establishment clause.7
7

See Collins v. Chandler

Opponents of the Lee v Weisman ruling allege that
the conflicts exist among recent rulings in the Courts of
Appeals. The Sixth Circuit, in Stein v. Plainwell Community
Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987), applied a test from
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (where nonsectarian
prayers opening state legislative sessions were upheld
because of the traditional nature of the practice), to
reject the use of the nonsecular prayers during graduation
ceremonies. The First Circuit in Weisman v. Lee, 728 F.
Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990)
rejected the Marsh test as inapplicable to the situation of
public schools. Instead they adopted the three-prong
Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) (affording particular concern for prayer in the
particular context of public elementary and secondary
schools). Those in favor of certiorari review want the
Supreme Court to rule on the appropriateness of applying the
Marsh test to public school prayer issues.
However, three weeks after the Stein decision was
handed down, the Supreme Court confirmed the appropriateness
of the Lemon test in school related Establishment Clause
cases. Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The
Court further specified that because the Marsh test was
founded upon a historical approach, it was "not useful in
determining the proper roles of church and state in public
schools, since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted." Id. at
583 n.4. Thus, the Supreme Court has already decided which
test to apply to the public school context.
The Attorney General's emphasis upon the traditional
use of prayer in graduation ceremonies in Utah and his
willingness to ignore the holding in Edwards indicates a
pro-prayer stance. In addition the brief interprets Board
of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mercrens. 495 U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 2356 (1990), as suggesting that "prayer at
a school ceremony outside the classroom context may be
constitutionally valid", when this case actually holds that
prayer at religious club meeting was valid under the Equal
Access Act. This reading of the case again illustrates the
Attorney General's bias toward overturning Lee v Weisman.
By itself, his request for certiorari represents a proprayer position. In addition, his alleged impartial brief
employs legal reasoning and interpretation that favors an
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Unified School District, 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981);
Jagger v. Douglas County School District, 862 F.2d 824 (11th
Circuit); Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools. 822 F.2d
14 06 (6th Cir* 1987).

Indeed, asking the Supreme Court to

review the Rhode Island case was a request to overrule this
long established policy against prayer in public school.
Only those who desire a weakening of the establishment
clause and more religious exercises in public schools would
seek an opportunity for the overruling of a case which
upheld these principles.
Additionally, the Attorney General justified his amicus
brief in part because he sought the end of litigation in
Utah's courts concerning prayer at school.

Of course, a

decision by the Supreme Court to deny certiorari would
achieve this goal more readily.

Such a denial would uphold

the First Circuit's ruling that prayer in public high school
ceremonies violates the establishment clause.

Indeed,

because the First Circuit's ruling is consistent with
precedent and with Utah's clear constitutional provisions,
without further review it could stand as a solid guide to
Utah's public school officials.

Similarly, the case could

abandonment of the Supreme Courts' long established policy
of preventing prayer in the public school context.
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serve as important precedent in the adjudication of any Utah
prayer cases still pending under federal law.
Another dilemma which the Attorney General envisioned - public school officials trapped between individuals
seeking to compel prayers at schools and those wishing to
prevent them —

is totally unfounded.

In Abington School

District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the argument that failure to allow
organized prayer would either violate the free exercise
clause or would amount to the establishment of religious
secularism.

See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)

(rejecting a state statute endorsing silent prayer because
the purpose of the bill was to return voluntary prayer to
the public schools).

The Attorney General could not

honestly seek remedy for this fictitious dispute by calling
for guidance from the Supreme Court.

Alternatively, Utah

could easily avoid the issue of graduation prayer by
establishing a neutral stance with respect to religion,
denying prayer at public school functions.
Most importantly, the provisions of Utah's
constitutional establishment clause remain the final
determinative factor as to the propriety of prayer in Utah
public schools.

See Sands v. Moronao Unified School
25

District, 809 P. 2d 809, 836 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (maintaining in the context of graduation prayer
the "[s]tate courts are, and should be, the first line of
defense for individual liberties").

Although the present

holdings of the various federal Courts of Appeals present a
unified legal basis to which Utah Courts can look to, the
Utah Constitution requires protection more expansive than
that provided under federal law.
The United States Supreme Court in deciding Weisman v.
Lee will not consider the controlling provisions in Art. I,
§ 4 of the Utah Constitution.

Thus, a decision in Weisman

v. Lee will be of little help in determining the scope and
application of Art. I, § 4 to high school graduation prayers
in Utah.
Thus, the alleged goals which the Attorney General
sought to advance by petitioning for certiorari could have
been equally achieved without the expenditure of public
funds and without taking a stance favoring religious
exercises.

However, he explicitly chose to argue for

certiorari review and the eventual reversal of the
prohibition of graduation prayers.

This, added to his

promise to file a brief on the merits in the Rhode Island
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case, constitutes an unlawful expenditure of public funds to
advance a religious practice.
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CONCLUSION
No facts have been presented to this Court or to the
trial court to establish that plaintiffs' claims are moot.
On its face, plaintiffs' complaint is not moot.

The burden

was and is on defendant to present facts to establish
mootness; defendant has failed to do so.
The constitutionality of the Attorney General's
behavior should be determined by this court.

The present

case questions the legality of an expenditure of public
funds in support of a legal stance to allow a public school
system to encourage and support the practice of religion.
Although the Attorney General has already filed a brief in
support of petition to grant certiorari and may be prevented
from filing further court briefs in Weisman v. Lee, the case
should still be reviewed and considered despite any possible
mootness.

Important constitutional issues and questions of

official mis-conduct, capable of repetition, remain to be
addressed.
Requesting United State Supreme Court review of the
First Circuit ruling in Weisman v. Lee displays a clear
interest in overturning the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

The endorsement, by the Utah Attorney General, of
28

prayer within the Providence, Rhode Island public high
school system should be declared unconstitutional.
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and
this matter remanded for further hearing on the merits of
plaintiffs' claims.
Dated this 2nd day of MARCH, 1992.

BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney for Plaintiffs
sosvand.scb
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4)
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
to:
JOHN s. MCALLISTER

Attorneys for Defendant
Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State
Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the 2ND day of MARCH, 1992, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC.
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and,
RICHARD ANDREWS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney
General of the State of
Utah,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

C O M P L A I N T

Civil NO.91-090-2847 CV

(Hon. F. Noel

THE PLAINTIFFS, as a cause of action against R. Paul
Van Dam, state and allege as follows:

1.

The Society of Separationists, Inc. is a Maryland

non-profit corporation registered to do business in Utah.
One of the corporate goals of the Society and of the Utah
Chapter of the corporation is to preserve and maintain the
separation of church and state as required by the United

States Constitution (First Amendment) and the Utah Constitution (Art. I, § 4 ) .
2.

The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists,

Inc. is made up of individual members who are residents and
taxpayers of the State of Utah.
3.
of Utah.

Chris Allen is a resident and citizen of the State
He is a taxpayer and has for many years paid

various taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah.
He is a member and the Director of the Utah Chapter of the
Society of Separationists, Inc.
4.

Richard Andrews is a resident and citizen of the

State of Utah.

He is a taxpayer and has for many years paid

various taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah.
He is a member and the Co-Director of the Utah Chapter of
the Society of Separationists, Inc.
5.

R. Paul Van Dam is the duly elected and serving

Attorney General of the State of Utah.

He supervises

assistant attorneys general working for and employed by the
State of Utah in the Office of the Utah Attorney General.
6.

Art. I, § 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in

pertinent part:
. . . The State shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . There shall be no
union of Church and State, nor shall any church
dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be

appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the
support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
7.

The State of Utah acting by and through the defen-

dant, R. Paul Van Dam filed an amicus brief before the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Robert E. Lee, et
al v. Daniel Weisman, etc., Case No. 90-1014, urging that
Court to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari.

(That

case is hereinafter referred to as the "Rhode Island School
Prayer case.")

The issue in that case is a challenge on

federal constitutional grounds to a practice of having
denominational prayers at high school graduation ceremonies
in the state of Rhode Island.
8.

The United States Supreme Court has granted

certiorari in the Rhode Island School Prayer case describe
above.
9.

The defendant R. Paul Van Dam has publically stated

that his office on behalf of the State of Utah or an agency
thereof will file an amicus brief in the United States
Supreme Court in Rhode Island School Prayer case addressing
the merits of that case.
10.

The preparation and filing of such an amicus brief

on the merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case by the
defendant and his staff on behalf of the State of Utah or an

agency thereof will result in the use and expenditure of
public money and/or property by the defendant and his staff.
11.

The preparation and filing of such an amicus brief

on the merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case by the
defendant and his staff on behalf of the State of Utah will
result in the use and expenditure of public money or property by the defendant and his staff in the aid of religious
worship, exercise or instruction, and/or for the support of
an ecclesiastical establishment.
12.

The use of the name of the State of Utah in filing

of such an amicus brief on the merits in the Rhode Island
School Prayer case by the defendant will result in the
support of an ecclesiastical establishment.
13.

The plaintiffs object to the expenditure of public

funds for the purpose of aiding any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, and/or for the support of an
ecclesiastical establishment.
14.

The plaintiffs object to the use of the name of

the State of Utah in filing of such an amicus brief on the
merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case as improper
support of an ecclesiastical establishment.
15.

The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and

restrained by this Court, the defendant will expend public

funds as set forth above in violation of Art. I# § 4 of the
Utah Constitution.
16.

The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and

restrained by this Court, the defendant will violate Art. I,
§ 4 of the Utah Constitution by supporting a ecclesiastical
establishment through the filing of an amicus brief in the
name of the State of Utah.
17.

The anticipated actions of the defendant in

preparing and filing an amicus brief on the merits in the
Rhode Island School Prayer case will be in violation of the
provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.

WHEREFORE, this Court should enter a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction and a permanent
injunction against the defendant, his agents, staff and
employees prohibiting them from expending any public funds
or property in preparing and filing an amicus brief on the
merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case.
This Court should enter a temporary restraining order,
a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction against
the defendant, his agents, staff and employees prohibiting
them from preparing and filing an amicus brief on the merits
in the Rhode Island School Prayer case in the name of the
State of Utah.

Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs incurred
herein and such other and further relief as the Court deems
just and proper in the premises.
DATED LAW DAY this 1st day of MAY, 1991UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC.
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and
RICHARD ANDREWS,

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 910902847 CV

Plaintiffs,
vs.
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney
General of the State of Utah,
Defendant,
Now

before

the

Court

is defendants Motion to Dismiss,

the Court has reviewed the memos filed in

connection

with

said

motion and now rules as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that inasmuch as the State
now

barred

from

filing

any brief on the merits of the case in

Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 pending before the Supreme
the

United

States, that

this

matter

relief requested by plaintiffs in
injunctive

relief

their

is

now moot.

complaint

Court

pertains

possibility

Court

longer

exists.

Further

the

persuaded that any opinion it might render on the merits
case

to

regarding the possible filing by the Attorney
matter.

instant

of

The only

Generals Office of a brief in the above mentioned
no

is

would

That
is not
in

the

provide any future guidance to the Attorney

SOC. OF SEPARATIONISTS V VAN DAM

Generals

Office

on

cases

PAGE 2

that

MINUTE ENTRY

may arise in the United States

Supreme Court in the future.
While

the

regard to the
petition

plaintiffs

brief

stage

already

of

the

filing of that brief has
abuse

Lee

have

not

filed

by

v.

been

sought
the

any relief with

defendant

at

Weisman case, nevertheless the

condemned

by

plaintiffs

as

similar

fashion

authority

in

school

that

would

clear

ceremonies.

This

issue

up

some

of

the

is

a

matter

of

interest and significance, and is certainly of interest

and importance to the people of the State of
the

abuse

now exists in the law on the matter of prayer at

graduation

national

not

asking the Supreme Court to review a case in

the hope that the Court's ruling
confusion

in

in the future. The Court feels compelled to

note that it is of the opinion that the defendant did
its'

an

of the defendant's authority and relied upon by plaintiffs

as an indication that the defendant may abuse its' authority
a

the

litigation

involving

Utah

in

light

of

school prayer that now exists between

citizens and entities of the State of Utah
For

the .reasons

stated,

stated in defendant's memorandum
Motion

to

Dismiss.

and
the

further
Court

for

the reasons

grants

defendant's

Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an

order consistent with this ruling.
DATED this

\_ day of July, 1991.

x—^

FRANK G. N O E L \
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE J

v
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid,
this

day of July, 1991:

Brian M. Barnard
John Pace
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
R« Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
John S. McAllister
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to

the

following,

R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312
Attorney General
JOHN S. MCALLISTER #2140
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3220
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC,
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and,
RICHARD ANDREWS ,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
-vCivil No. 910902847CV
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney
General of the State of Utah,
Judge:

Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
The court, having considered argument pursuant to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated May 28, 1991, under Rule 4501 C.J.A,, and being fully advised in the premises, and having
made its Minute Entry dated July 9, 1991, which entry is on file
herein,
NOW ORDERS, that this matter be and hereby is dismissed
with prejudice.
, 1991

Dated this ji_l' day of

FRANK G. NOEL
District Judge
(

PLAINTIFF'
EXHIBIT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
AJLV-

I

day of

1991, a copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal

was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
BRIAN M. BARNARD
JOHN PACE
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204

-2-

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC. a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN;
and, RICHARD ANDREWS,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 910902847 CV

vs.
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney
General of the State of
Utah,

(Hon. Frank G. Noel)
Defendant.
The plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby appeal
that certain Order and Dismissal signed in the above
captioned matter on July 30, 1991 and as embodied in the
minute entry dated July 9, 1991.

This appeal is to the Utah

Supreme Court.
DATED this l ^ f day of AUGUST, 1991.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs—^

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
JOHN S. MCALLISTER
Attorney for Defendant
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the 'ffi&i day of AUGUST, 1991, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH.LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB # 5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND.FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; etc.,
Plaintiffs,

:

EXHIBIT &
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE

vs.

:

Civil No. 91-0902847 CV

R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney
General of the State of
Utah,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS, by and through counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD
and JOHN PACE of the Utah Legal Clinic submit the attached
EXHIBIT (a photocopy of a "Letter to the Editor" written by
the defendant and published by the Salt Lake Tribune on
Wednesday, April 24, 1991).
Plaintiffs request that this Court take judicial notice

of this "Letter to the Editor," its content and its publication as set forth above.
DATED this 3rd day of JUNE, 1991.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing EXHIBIT & REQUEST to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
JOHN S. MCALLISTER
Attorneys for Defendant
3 6 South State Street
# 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
on the &//
day of JUNE, 1991, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff

rintea on political leuers
is somehow the responsibility of the
United States.
1 . . may be withheld for good
Orve could make the argument that
reason on others. Writers are
President Bush should have allowed
limited to one letter of 300
the troops to go on to Baghdad to
words or less every 14 days.
dispose of Saddam, but such an acPreference will be given to typetion would have been illegal under
written (double spaced) letters
the United Nations mandate and in
permitting use of the writer's
all likelihood would not have
true name. All letters are subchanged the fate of the Kurds. Every
ject to condensation. Mail to the
five to 10 years the Kurds have chalPublic Forum, The Salt Lake
lenged the Iraqis in Baghdad and
Tribune, P.O. Box 867, Salt Lake
have ben crushed in their attempts.
City, Utah 84110.
The Kurds obviously made a conscious decision once again during the
gulf war to revolt, and once again
they have failed.
The United States bears no reIn response to Jeffrey W. Squires
sponsibility for this decision or their (Forum,
April 15), I can assure you
present plight. In fact I feel that the that you can
express your conscience
billions of dollars being spent on any time, any place, without any insupposed humanitarian aid would be terference from the American Civil
far better spent on our homeless and Liberties Union. Indeed, should anypoor here in the United States where one else interfere, the ACLU would
we would be assured of proper dis- defend your right to freedom of extribution.
pression.
I have been appalled by the news
reports showing the Kurds brutaliz- tempts
ing and killing each other to get at the st&
the supplies being sent to the area. It (or re1o
is quite obvious that these people do ful th ?.
not care about each other but only right ^
their own personal well-being. No at- religion
tempt is being made by the Kurds to peopk£
organize distribution of the aid in a than I*
fair and efficient fashion.
The Kurds chose to flee their
homes and go into the wilderness to
freeze and starve instead of staying
3 CL
and fighting Saddam. Either choice
would mean death and destruction 2 S, ~ 3
but one choice would have b e e ; g ? K ^ H
based on honor and bravery, the o3- w cr 5*
§•
<T clearly is not.
. S^j» a
ro
(A
JAMESH§S^2.o3
\*<
SaltLakt^3s£!o

Defends Rights

>-d

o

sr

- Sf *i 55 o I-I •"*

a

Inaccurate
Accoi 5 i I f i i 3
Never in any media,
w

* ^w g ,_ wM pto ^2 a
television, radio and newsprint,
inc£ a WM » 2.
I ever seen a more inaccurate
di^ 5. ~ cr 2^ 3~ gg
CO
CO
tion of what was said than the opg\£'< 2
B' £
8 B
g. 2
a §g.
mg sentence of Carol Sisco's and k £> %w § ft 8- ghnda Sowerby's article [on LD*
°
General Conference] in the April ?
issue of Tfie Tribune. They wroU
Parents were counseled Saturd,
to offer up a second son if or
killed while serving a Mormon mis- On a single outing last fall, not even
sion."
during peak user months, my comThey could not have distorted panions and I collected nine, 50-galMarvin J Ashton's remarks to a lon bags of trash before our activity,
greater extent than they did in this simply to make our chosen site fit for
article Did they listen to the same human habitation.
talk that thousands of others heard,
A six-pack of beer, a hamburger
or did they obtain their opening
line and fries or a movie cost less than a
1
from "a reliable source?' Surely day pass to the canyon. Even if evthey did not listen to Elder Ashton's eryone who uses the canyon toted
talk and come up with such an out- out all the trash (and people don't),
landish interpretation themselves.
there would be attrition and damage
Ladies . . ladies . . . plead igno- from the mere intrusion of humans
rance on your grossly misinterpreted into the ecosystem. Reforestation,
distortion of what was written and sanitation, maintenance of barbecue
apologize to Marvin J. Ashton. More and picnic equipment, ranger serimportantly, after writing something vices are not freebies. Users of the
so absolutely inaccurate, you should canyon should pay for these.
Learning that we are caretakers,
both personally apologize to the fain-
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is rhpnn at twice the

Wayne" Owe
id Bill Orton have
their eyes a. mioses on this section
of wilderness.
EUGENE J. FAUX M.D.
Provo

Seeks Prayer Truce
I appreciated The Tribune's editorial March 24 on the temporary
"cease-fire" in the conflict over
graduation prayers at public schools
now that the U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to hear the case of Lee vs.
Weisman from Providence, R.L
I am very pleased that the court
hai? finally agreed to hear such a
case. Our public school officials find
very little authoritative guidance under current decisions as to the constitutional permissibility of prayer at
commencement exercises. It was for
that reason that my office, on behalf
of the Utah State Board of Education, filed a "friend of the court"
brief urging the court to agree to
hear the case. Now that the court has
agreed, we will also be filing a brief
"on the merits," not arguing for
more or less prayer, but for clear
and manageable guidelines for our
school officials to know what to do.
The high court's decision to hear
the Rhode Island case now means
that a resolution of the graduation
prayer issue is in sight, and argument is expected for October or November of this year. In light of this
development, I certainly do feel that
further expenditure of tax funds in
defending additional prayer cases in
Utah courts is not prudent. Whatever small victories are earned in the
short term will be mooted when the
high court rules in the Weisman
case.
Of course, the decision to spend
tax dollars in defense of prayers at
this spring's commencement ceremonies in Utah is not mine to make.
Those decisions will probably be
made by the school districts in question.
The sub-theme of your editorial,
that my comments as to the advisabilityu of a short-term neutral stance
were late" was perplexing to me It
would be most inappropriate for me
to assume that I should "speak up"
and pre-empt decisions which are, in
Utah's system of government, entrusted to the legislature, governor,
school districts or courts. It is not the
attorney general's responsibility to
decide whether the districts will allow prayers, nor to fight or to finance the inevitable lawsuits which
are filed in response to such prayers
If you mean, by your suggestion of
lateness, that I shoula have rendered
legal opinion on the subject, that also
misses the mark. This office gives legal opinions only in circumstances
defined by state statute, of which
none have ever been presented to us.
My comment urging a temporary
truce was prompted solely by the
dramatic news from the high court.
Why not put a short-term hold on the
emotional and economic hemorrhage and wait for the only answer

